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LIBERALISM, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE VALUE
OF PROPERTY UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In most of Europe, expropriation must comply with the standards set under European
human rights law. Article 1 of the First Protocol (‘P1-1’) to the European Convention
on Human Rights declares that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions.’ The European Court of Human Rights has stated that
the right would be ‘largely illusory and ineffective’ if it did not guarantee full com-
pensation in all but exceptional circumstances.1 It is quite clear, however, that this was
not the belief of at least some of the States that had signed it when it came into force in
1954. P1-1 makes no reference to compensation. An interference must be lawful, and
in the public or general interest, but there is nothing that expressly requires compen-
sation. Nevertheless, the Court has declared that any interference with the right to the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a ‘‘fair balance’ between the demands
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights’,2 and this means that expropriation without compen-
sation that is reasonably related to the value of the property would normally violate the
owner’s rights under P1-1.3
This article asks the question: how did the Court arrive at an interpretation that is
clearly at odds with the original expectations of some signatories? Compensation was
one of the most ﬁercely contested aspects of the right to property, and indeed of all
Convention rights. The absence of a reference to a guarantee of compensation was not
an oversight: it was certainly not regarded as a necessary element of the right to
property that was too obvious to require mention. Nothing was said because, in effect,
the States agreed to disagree about compensation, and silence expressed that agree-
ment perfectly. The original text represented a compromise between liberal and social
democrat visions of property and human rights, and that compromise could only be
reached by leaving out any reference to compensation. However, the Court has not
been entirely comfortable with that compromise, and it has steadily moved to a liberal
construction of P1-1. It has never explained why it has done so, except in brief asser-
tions about illusory and ineffective rights. It has not claimed, for example, that this
position is a result of evolutive or dynamic interpretation. The judgments do not assert
that a new consensus in favour of compensation emerged at some point after P1-1 came
into force, or that changing social and economic conditions made earlier interpretations
of P1-1 untenable. Indeed, it sometimes appears that the Court is often unaware
that there are alternative, social democrat readings of P1-1 that might inform the
jurisprudence.
1 James v United Kingdom (App No 8793/79) (1986) Series A No 98 [54]; Lithgow v United
Kingdom (App No 9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81) (1986)
Series A No 102 [120].
2 Sporrong and Lo¨nnroth v Sweden (App No 7151/75; 7152/75) (1982) Series A No 52 [69].
3 James (n 1) [36]; Lithgow (n 1) [50]–[51].
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The article begins by examining the liberal and social democrat views on property
and human rights, their relationship with compensation and expropriation, and how
they were reﬂected in the debates on the right to property and its ﬁnal text. It then
examines the source of the compensation principle in a seminal trilogy of cases
of the 1980s: Sporrong and Lo¨nnroth v Sweden,4 Lithgow v United Kingdom5 and
James v United Kingdom.6 It explains that, although these cases represent a movement
to the liberal version of the right to property, there were still strong elements of social
democrat thinking. It then goes on to demonstrate that the subsequent jurisprudence,
especially that of the last ﬁve years or so, has moved even further away from the social
democrat position. Increasingly, the free market represents the norm for judging all
State action affecting property, and the Court cannot even conceptualize an alternative
perspective on the right to property.
II. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
A. The Liberal Right to Property
The liberal view of human rights and democracy concentrates on the protection of
individual liberty from the State.7 It regards expropriation and regulation as inter-
ferences in a natural or normal state of affairs, in which property owners are free to use
and dispose of their property as they see ﬁt, subject only to narrow restrictions on
actions that harm others. Property has a ‘true’ or ‘real’ value, which is determined by
reference to transactions on an unregulated market. There are, of course, legitimate
areas for State control: for example, a good constitutional order would include a legal
system that allows owners to vindicate their property rights in a timely and effective
manner. However, as a general principle, liberal governments would leave decisions
regarding the use and disposition of property to the owners. State action regarding
private property is seen as an interference with liberty, and as such it requires justiﬁ-
cation. Hence, expropriation can be justiﬁed only if, to the fullest extent possible, it
leaves the owner no worse off than he or she would have been under an ordinary
consensual transaction with other private persons. In other words, expropriation should
be conditional on payment of market value compensation.8
It is this view that seems to lie behind the use of the market value as the standard for
compensation under P1-1. It sees the relationship between owners of private property
and the State as one of opposition. Their interests must be balanced against each other,
and that balance can only be struck if the owner receives market value compensation
on expropriation.9 Moreover, the protection of property is not a necessary outcome of
4 Sporrong (n 2). 5 Lithgow (n 1). 6 James (n 1).
7 For a modern expression of liberal property theory, see RA Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA 1985);
cf TC Grey ‘The Malthusian Constitution’ (1986) 41 U Miami LR 21.
8 Arguably, subjective values should be taken into account as well: see T Allen,
‘Compensation for Property under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2007) 28
Michigan JIL 287.
9 The balance need not be struck by the judicial branch: in other words, a constitution may
frame a property right in terms that leave the judiciary with no clear power to balance interests.
Nevertheless, the balance has still been struck, but by the drafters of the constitution.
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securing democracy. Democracy might exist without property, and democracy can
represent a threat to property.
The converse argument—that the protection of property is necessary for democracy,
or at least that it makes democratic institutions more effective—has been made by
some liberals. As Carol Rose has put it, ‘the classical political brief for property stated
that private property supports democracy and liberty.’10 Individuals need the assurance
of a minimum level of personal and economic security before they can be persuaded to
engage in the democratic process at all, and the institution of private property helps to
provide that sense of security. A similar argument, but more directly related to com-
pensation and value, considers the accountability of elected representatives to the
electorate. In Pennell v San Jose, Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United
States maintained that:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers to be
achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be
achieved ‘off budget’ with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal
democratic processes.11
For example, many States seek to protect tenants from rent increases by imposing rent
controls on landlords, but they could protect tenants just as easily by providing them
with direct monetary grants to cover rent. This, of course, would require the legislature
to raise taxes. As more taxpayers are affected, it would become more likely that the
merits and costs of taking and regulating property would feature in political debate.
Hence, Justice Scalia felt that a rule of full compensation has the ‘happy effect’ of
‘fostering of an intelligent democratic process’.12
In Europe, the debate on P1-1 did not examine the relationship between property,
human rights and democracy to this depth. In the early Consultative Assembly debates
on proposals for a human rights treaty, Lord Layton, an inﬂuential British member
of the Assembly, argued that the proposed treaty ‘should be limited to the absolute
minimum necessary to constitute the cardinal principles for the functioning of political
democracy’, and hence it should not include a right to property.13 He grouped the right
to property with other social and economic rights: they were certainly important, but
the protection of these rights could wait until democracy was secured.14 None of the
other members of the Assembly addressed his argument directly. This is not particu-
larly surprising, as there was no clear idea of the relationship between human rights
and democracy generally. The Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe states
that ‘individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law’ are ‘principles which
form the basis of all genuine democracy’.15 The Preamble to the Convention on Human
Rights declares that ‘effective political democracy’ and ‘a common understanding
and observance of the human rights’ are the basis for maintaining the fundamental
freedoms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Neither treaty
10 CM Rose, ‘Privatization—The Road to Democracy?’ (2006) 50 Saint Louis Uni LJ 691,
700–701. 11 485 US 1, 22–23 (1988). 12 ibid.
13 Council of Europe, Collected edition of the‘travaux pre´paratoires’ of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Recueil des travaux pre´paratoires de la Convention europe´enne
des droits de l’homme (M Nijhoff, The Hague, 1975–1985) vol 2, 52.
14 ibid 54–56; see also 80 (Elmgren, Sweden).
15 Art 3 also declares that states that subsequently wished to join the Council of Europe would
be expected to accept ‘the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within
its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
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makes it clear whether democracy and human rights stand independently of each other,
or in mutual support, or in opposition. Democracy seems to be both an outcome of
protecting human rights, and a precondition for protection.
It is therefore not too surprising that those who supported a right to property, with a
strong compensation guarantee, did not claim that it would enhance democratic
governance. They felt that even a democratic government could represent a threat to
property, and that there was a conﬂict between public and private interests in property.
The protection for property could not be absolute, but neither could it be cast aside at
the whim of governments; some balance must be struck, and the only fair balance
would be that which most closely reproduced the conditions of a consensual private
transaction. The ideal form of a right to property would include an express guarantee of
market value compensation.
B. The Social Democrat Right to Property
In the post-World War II period, in Western Europe, the social democrat view of a
human right to property presented an important alternative to the liberal view.16 For
social democrats, human rights were not solely about individual autonomy and lim-
itations on State power. Human rights included claims to the basic goods needed to live
a meaningful life. Hence, a complete charter of human rights would include positive
obligations to housing, education, health care, and the like. Finding a way to im-
plement these obligations in enforceable legal instruments would be difﬁcult, but it did
not mean that these obligations did not exist. The social democrat vision also saw the
regulation of property in a fundamentally different light. For social democrats, the
pre-War experience demonstrated that a failure to control capitalism and the free
market could produce economic cycles that left basic needs unsatisﬁed. Regulation
would moderate the cycles of the unregulated economy and help to ensure that human
rights received respect. Hence, the regulation of property is therefore not a primary
threat to human rights: it is the failure to regulate that is the greater threat. For social
democrats, regulation is not an interference with a natural or normal state of affairs;
regulation is the normal state of affairs in a nation that respects human rights.
This had several implications. To begin with, for liberals, compensation was
described in terms of corrective justice, where expropriation is seen as a form of
injury which must be corrected by compensation. The classic statement is William
Blackstone’s, who asserted that, although the legislature may compel the individual to
give up property, it can only do so ‘by giving him a full indemniﬁcation and equivalent
for the injury thereby sustained.’17 In social democrat thinking, compensation was
more often seen in terms of distributive justice, comparable in purpose and effect to
other forms of social insurance or welfare. Questions surrounding compensation for
property were not categorically different than the questions about State support for the
unemployed, public health care, or for ailing industries during periods of economic
crisis. The choice of an appropriate compensation standard therefore depends on the
16 S Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s
Twentieth Century (CUP, New York, 2006); J Callaghan, The Retreat of Social Democracy
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000) 1–25.
17 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765)
135.
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relationship of the duty to satisfy basic human needs through public projects (for which
property may be required), and the risk and the impact on investor behaviour that the
compensation standard may have. It may be the case, for example, that full market
value compensation may deter local governments from undertaking socially valuable
programmes. Conversely, the risk of uncompensated expropriation may drive private
capital to other jurisdictions, or into economic sectors that are relatively unproductive
but where assets are less likely to be expropriated. In relation to human rights, the
policy makers would focus on the impact of a given compensation standard on
the likelihood of satisfying basic human needs, both of the property owners and anyone
else who may be affected by its compensation policy. This analysis is not a simple one:
indeed, Frank I Michelman argues that a regime that never compensates for takings of
property would run the risk of demoralising its citizens, and the consequent loss of
investment would offset any gains from the ‘free’ acquisition of property. By contrast,
Blume and Rubinfeld argue that economic efﬁciency is furthered by denying com-
pensation to property owners who are able to self-insure against the political risk of
expropriation.18 The point is that insurance is not a form of restitution or recompense
for a wrong, and payments for expropriation are not intended to restore the ‘victim’ to a
prior position, but that the State must consider issues over compensation as part of
general issues of the management of the economy. For social democrats, the difﬁculty
with the ﬁxed standard of liberal theory is that it transfers these questions of economic
management from the legislature to the courts.
The social democrats also challenged the liberal notion that there is a ‘real’
(ie market) value of property that exists in the absence of regulation. Indeed, in prac-
tical terms, it could be impossible to identify a prior, unregulated state of affairs. One
well-known British example concerned the post-war nationalization of the railways.19
At various times, there were suggestions the valuation for the shares in the railways
should be based on asset values, or recent or projected proﬁts, or on ‘reasonable net
maintainable revenue’. Even those who supported a single standard differed on its
application. For example, those who argued for compensation to be based on proﬁts
differed over the relevant period: was the best indication of the value of a company
its proﬁt ﬁgures for the pre-war period (which had been poor), or during the war (which
were stronger), or those projected for the future (very poor, and possibly nil, at least
without State support of one form or another)? The problem was that there was no
unregulated state of affairs in the railway industry that might have provided a standard.
Ultimately, the companies were nationalized on the basis of share prices quoted on the
London Stock Exchange. Even so, there were arguments that the quoted prices did not
yield an accurate valuation, especially after the 1945 election, because they depended
18 FI Michelman ‘Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
‘Just Compensation’ Law’ (1967) 80 Harvard LR 1165; L Blume and D Rubinfeld ‘Compensation
for Takings: An Economic Analysis’ (1984) 72 Calif LR 569.
19 G Crompton ‘‘A very poor bag of assets’: the railway compensation issue 1921–47’ (1996)
6 Accounting, Business and Financial History 73. On the development of economic and natio-
nalization policies in post-War Britain, see T Jones ‘Labour Revisionism and Public Ownership,
1951–63’ (1991) 5 Contemporary British History 432; S Brooke ‘Revisionists and Funda-
mentalists: The Labour Party and Economic Policy during the Second World War’ (1989) 32 The
Historical Journal 157.
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as much on speculation on the ultimate policy on compensation as it did on anything
else.20
The picture was equally complex in relation to land.21 During the war, the need to
reconstruct bombed-out town centres brought attention to bear on compensation and
planning. It was assumed that local authorities would need to take the lead in large-
scale reconstruction, and that would involve the purchase of property in damaged
areas. However, the extent of damage and the decline in income from the rates left
many authorities without the funds that would have been required to compensate at full
market value and still carry out reconstruction. But, going beyond the question of
affordability, a number of factors cast doubt on the suitability of market values as the
yardstick for compensation. To begin with, social democrats generally subscribed to
the belief that much of the value of land was produced by social or community action,
rather than individual effort.22 For example, improvements in infrastructure can
increase economic growth and, in particular, the demand for land or other types of
property. Accordingly, there were various proposals for recouping this value, such as
the nationalization of land or taxation of land values. It also followed that, even in the
absence of wholesale nationalization, social democrats doubted that compensation
for the acquisition of land for a public use should include payment for value created by
the community.
The war raised other, more speciﬁc concerns. In particular, there was a widespread
conviction that speculators should not proﬁt unfairly from the war or from recon-
struction. There was a general belief that the market in land had been driven at least
partly by speculation, especially in areas that were heavily damaged by bombing, and
that the speculation itself was driven by a belief that public authorities would offer
generous compensation or other support as part of reconstruction. Speculation, it was
believed, should not be rewarded by full compensation. In any case, there was a feeling
that land owners should not beneﬁt from increases in the value of land arising from the
investment of central or local authorities in reconstruction (except, of course, to the
extent that everyone shared in the beneﬁts of reconstruction). Accordingly, the inﬂu-
ential cross-party Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment recommended
that the standard for compensation should be set at the market values that stood in
1939.23 However, this did not resolve the controversy, as property values had dropped
in some areas and risen in others. Not surprisingly, Labour members of the Coalition
government argued that 1939 values should be the ceiling for compensation, and
Conservative members saw them as the ﬂoor. But behind this controversy lay an im-
portant point of agreement: current market values did not provide an appropriate
standard for compensation in many cases.
The Uthwatt Report also highlighted other doubts over the source of value and the
relevance of the market in a regulated economy. Where the use of land is subject to
development plans, speculation over the possibility of a grant of permission to change
the use of land can drive market prices over the actual value of a change of use. That is,
20 See Crompton ibid 87.
21 See M Tichelar ‘The Conﬂict over Property Rights in the Second World War: The Labour
Party’s Abandonment of Land Nationalization’ (2003) 14 Twentieth Century British History 165;
AW Cox, Adversary Politics and Land: The Conﬂict over Land and Property Rights in Post-war
Britain (Cambridge, 1984) 40–50. 22 Cox ibid 27–28.
23 Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment, Final Report (Cmd 6386, 1942).
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in the area covered the plan, the value of permission to develop land ‘ﬂoats’ over the
planning area until it settles on a speciﬁc plot. Economists had observed that the
aggregate ﬂoating value of development often exceeded the value of the development
itself, once it had settled on a speciﬁc plot.24 Speculation on the outcome of planning,
and indeed on many other types of governmental decisions, appeared to distort market
values. Once again, the market seemed to be an unreliable indicator of value.
Many of the principles of the Uthwatt Report were carried through to the Town and
Country Planning Act 1947.25 The Act nationalized the right to develop land, by
making a change of use unlawful without planning permission. The Act, taken as a
whole, was intended to ensure that the public reaped the value of planning and devel-
opment. The Act allowed for compensation for the loss of the right to develop, but
equally it imposed charges to capture the increase in value arising solely from the grant
of permission. Compensation for acquisition was based on existing use values as they
stood when the Act came into force. This excluded the potential for a grant of per-
mission for a change of use, even if that potential was reﬂected in market prices. In
effect, the value of development belonged to the State.
The focus on existing use was also intended to iron out the ﬂuctuations in the
market for land. There was no direct control over the prices paid in private transactions,
but the limitations on compensation in compulsory acquisition would, it was thought,
impose some restraint on private speculation. As such, it would help to avoid the
economic cycles of capitalism that were thought to undermine political stability.
Again, the emphasis is on the relationship between compensation and economic
management.
The system created by1947 Act proved unworkable in many respects. The Town
and Country Planning Act 1959 put the emphasis back on market values. Com-
pensation still remains a subject of litigation and ofﬁcial review, especially in relation
to two key aspects of social democrat views on land and expropriation: whether the
owner should receive compensation for value created by a development scheme or for
value created by the potential for a grant of planning permission.26 However, the
central point is that the United Kingdom government certainly did not accept any
notion that land owners had a moral or legal expectation of full market value com-
pensation. The rejection of market values was not a rash decision, or based on short-
term political or ﬁnancial expediency. It was a principled approach to serious social
and economic issues.27
24 For a contemporary analysis, see A Robinson, ‘The Scott and Uthwatt Reports on Land
Utilisation’ (1943) 53 The Economic Journal 28, 34. AS Fogg, ‘Development Value and the Law:
The United Kingdom and Australian Experience’ (1978) 27 ICLQ 794, 798 compares it to a
lottery, as the aggregate amount paid for tickets can far exceed the prize money.
25 KC Clark, ‘The British Labor Government’s Town and Country Planning Act: A Study in
Conﬂicting Liberalisms’ (1951) 66 Political Science Quarterly 87; M Grant, ‘Compensation and
Betterment’ in B Cullingworth (ed), British Planning: 50 Years of Planning and Regional Policy
(Athlone Press, London, 1999).
26 Waters v Welsh Development Agency [2004] UKHL 19; Spirerose Ltd v Transport for
London [2009] UKHL 44; Law Commission of England and Wales, Towards a Compulsory
Purchase Code: (1) Compensation (Law Com No 286, 2003) (for a review of the history, see
151–221).
27 See AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the
European Convention (Oxford, OUP 2001) ch 15.
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The United Kingdom’s position was not unique. Other European constitutions
drafted around that time contained a strong social democrat orientation.28 For
example, the Italian Constitution of 1948 protects property, but this protection sits
alongside classic social democrat rights concerning work 29 and health, education
and welfare.30 The right to property provides that ownership is subject to the
‘social function’ of property, the ‘state’s right to heritage’ and the need to impose
obligations intended to serve the ‘purpose of ensuring rational utilization of land and
establishing equitable social relations’.31 It also states that ‘Private property, in cases
determined by law and with compensation, may be expropriated for reasons of com-
mon interest.’32 There was a guarantee of compensation, but it was not a guarantee of
market value. Indeed, in 1980, the Constitutional Court stated that compensation must
not be at a ‘negligible or merely symbolic level but must constitute serious relief ’.33
Crucially, it said that ‘serious relief ’ should not be equated with the market value of the
property.34
The Irish Constitution of 1937 also reﬂected both liberal and social democrat posi-
tions. Article 43 states that ‘man, in virtue of his rational being, has the natural right,
antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of external goods’.35 This reﬂects a
liberal focus, but article 43 also provides that the exercise of the right to property
‘ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social justice’ and may be
delimited ‘with a view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common
good.’ There was no speciﬁc guarantee of compensation, or indeed of market value
compensation, and the courts have not found one by implication. This proved inﬂu-
ential in subsequent policy debates: for example, in 1973, the Committee on the Price
of Building Land reviewed the case law and stated that ‘The alleged right of
landowners to get the full market price for something in limited supply (a right which
we believe does not exist) is not consistent with the common good.’36 The Committee
speciﬁcally recommended that local authorities should have the power to compulsorily
acquire land in designated areas at existing use value, with an additional 25 per cent.37
In 2004, the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution stated that the 1973
conclusions were still valid.38
28 Berman (n 16) 177–199. 29 Art 36. 30 Art 38.
31 Art 42; see also art 44(1) (‘For the purpose of ensuring rational utilization of land and
establishing equitable social relations, the law imposes obligations on and limitations to private
ownership of land, deﬁnes its limits depending on the regions and the various agricultural areas,
encourages and imposes land cultivation, transformation of large estates, and the reorganization
of productive units; it assists small and medium sized farms.’) 32 Art 43.
33 Judgment No 5 of 1980, as quoted in Judgment No 348 of 2007 [5.1] (the translation is
from the ofﬁcial website, at www.cortecostituzionale.it/versioni_in_lingua/eng/attivitacorte/pro-
nunceemassime/recent_judgments_2007.asp).
34 O Pollicino, ‘Constitutional Court at the crossroads between constitutional parochialism
and co-operative constitutionalism. Judgments No. 348 and 349 of 22 and 24 October 2007’
(2008) 4 European Constitutional LR 363.
35 JM Kelly, The Irish Constitution (Butterworths, London, 1994) 1061–1091.
36 Report of the Committee on the Price of Building Land (Prl. 3632, 1973) 47.
37 ibid 45; cf Kelly (n 35) 1085–86, who notes that the recommendation was not im-
plemented.
38 The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Ninth progress report: private
property (Dublin: Stationery Ofﬁce, 2004) 39; see also Dreher v Irish Land Commission [1984]
ILRM 94; O’Callaghan v The Commissioners of Public Works (1995) ILRM 364.
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Finally, article 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provided
that
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits
shall be deﬁned by the laws.
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be ordered
by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation.
Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance be-
tween the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of dispute
concerning the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary
courts.
Article 14 embodies the German constitutional model of Sozialstaat and Rechstaat.39
That is, the State has responsibility for the welfare of all its citizens, including sub-
sistence and a just distribution of wealth, but the State remains limited by law and can
only act through law. In the usual case, the ‘equitable balance’ of article 14(3) requires
market value compensation. However, departures may be justiﬁed in special circum-
stances:
An inﬂexible compensatory amount, which is related to the market value alone, is conse-
quently foreign to the Basic Law. It is also not correct that the person deprived of property
always ‘must be given a full equivalent for what has been taken’ by the compensatory
amount. The legislator can provide for full compensation or a compensatory amount less
than that, according to the circumstances.40
It should therefore be clear that social democratic views on property and compensation
were of at least some inﬂuence in Europe when P1-1 was debated. Liberalism was
certainly not dead, but it was counter-balanced by the social democrat view. It is
therefore not surprising that rise of social democracy had an impact on the drafting of
the Convention. This compromise is evident from the debate on the ﬁrst proposal for a
right to property, which provided as follows:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. Such
possessions cannot be subjected to arbitrary conﬁscation. The present measures shall not
however be considered as infringing, in any way, the right of a State to pass necessary
legislation to ensure that the said possessions are utilised in accordance with the general
interest.41
In the Consultative Assembly, it was said that the proposal was intended to ‘make the
distinction between arbitrary conﬁscation and the social conception of property which
allows it to be used by regular legislation for the public good.’42 Taken as a whole, it
seems to offer little more than a symbolic nod to liberalism, as it leaves the legislature
with virtually unlimited discretion over expropriation and regulation. Even so, it was
rejected, as some governments believed that the prohibition on ‘arbitrary conﬁscation’
39 GS Alexander ‘Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example’
(2003) 88 Cornell LR 733; AJ Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative
Analysis (Cape Town, Juta, 1999) 121–63.
40 BVerfGE 24, 367, 421 (1968) (‘Hamburg Flood Control Case’), in R Youngs (trans),
English, French And German Comparative Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 1998) 24.
41 Council of Europe (n 13) vol 6, 6–10; see also vol 6, 52ff, 130–140.
42 ibid vol 6, 48, 54 and 60.
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amounted to a requirement to compensate for nationalization of property.43 Not
surprisingly, subsequent proposals for a guarantee of ‘compensation’,44 ‘fair compen-
sation which shall be ﬁxed in advance’,45 or ‘such compensation as shall be determined
in accordance with the conditions provided for by law’46 were also rejected. The
present version of P1-1 was accepted only because it does not refer to compensation:
everyone is entitled to the ‘peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’, and ‘No one shall
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’47
The proposal was also challenged by those who feared that it would not leave the
State with a free hand to regulate property. That this was a concern may be surprising,
especially in light of its reference to ‘the right of a State to pass necessary
legislation . . .’. Nevertheless, for some governments, it still went too far. The ﬁnal
version makes it clear that the State would judge the necessity of regulatory laws, as it
states that ‘The preceding provisions [of P1-1] shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.’48
The result marked an uneasy and largely unarticulated compromise between
liberalism and social democracy. At ﬁrst glance, one might argue that P1-1 is a social
democrat right to property: property may deserve protection, but in the same way that
rights to housing or health care deserve protection. That is, it falls to the legislature to
determine extent of provision and entitlement, in the light of the State’s obligations
to secure basic goods for everyone. However, this does not necessarily mean that
questions of entitlement can be entirely trusted to the legislature or executive. In
matters affecting property, as with other social rights, individuals should have en-
forceable rights to a lawful process, and a guarantee that entitlements are provided and
administered without discrimination. Arguably, this is exactly what P1-1 does, and no
more: it guarantees a lawful process, and, in conjunction with article 14, it prohibits
discrimination in matters regarding expropriation and regulation. Nevertheless, the
liberal element is still present. It is property that is included in the Convention
rights, and not housing, health, or other social rights.49 Article 8, for example, does
not recognize a right to demand housing from the State, but only to respect for an
existing home. In addition, P1-1 conceives of property regulation as an interference
43 ibid vol 7, 208. 44 ibid vol 7, 206–208.
45 ibid vol 7, 194. 46 ibid vol 7, 222–24, 230.
47 The reference to ‘general principles of international law’ is concerned with the customary
rule requiring a State to compensate aliens for the expropriation of their property. See HR Fabri,
‘The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of
Compensation for ‘Regulatory Expropriations’ of the Property of Foreign Investors’ (2002) 11
New York University Environmental LJ 148. It has been argued that P1-1 should be interpreted so
as to extend the obligation to non-nationals to a State’s own nationals, but the Court rejected this
argument in Lithgow (n 1) [111]–[119]; E Schwelb, ‘The Protection of the Right to Property of
Nationals under the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1964) 13
American J Comparative L 518. 48 Emphasis added.
49 Art 2 of the First Protocol does provide a right to education, but it is stated in negative terms
(“No person shall be denied the right to education.”). As such, it is more concerned with dis-
crimination and with parental choice than minimum standards regarding the quality or availability
of education.
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with individual entitlement; the entitlement exists prior to any human rights law, rather
than being constituted by State response to basic needs.
III. THE FAIR BALANCE AND COMPENSATION
The ﬁrst close examination of the substantive content of P1-1 came in Handyside v
United Kingdom,50 which dealt with the conﬁscation of property judged to be obscene.
The Court regarded the conﬁscation as a measure for controlling the use of property,
and hence it fell under the third sentence of P1-1. Nevertheless, the case is signiﬁcant
because the Court stated that the third sentence of P1-1
sets the Contracting States up as sole judges of the ‘necessity’ for an interference.
Consequently, the Court must restrict itself to supervising the lawfulness and the purpose
of the restriction in question.51
It appears that there is no room for a proportionality or fair balance test. The Court only
required the United Kingdom to show that the conﬁscation was lawful, rationally
connected to the stated aim of the legislation, and not discriminatory.52 There was no
further requirement that it satisfy a test of fairness or proportionality. As such, the
judgment is consistent with a social democrat reading of P1-1.
Three years later, in Sporrong, the Court stated that an interference with property
would comply with P1-1 only if ‘a fair balance was struck between the demands of
the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights.’53 This represents a radical shift in thinking: from
reviewing only the lawfulness and the purpose of legislation, the Court would now
review the fairness of the legislation.54 On its face, Sporrong was not about ex-
propriation, but the issue of permits authorizing expropriation that were not acted upon
by the Swedish authorities. These permits did not prevent the rental or sale of the
property, but they did have the effect of depressing the market price for the property.
The applicants’ case focused on the length of time that the permits were left outstand-
ing: permits were issued for ﬁve years in the ﬁrst instance, but were often renewed,
without any real opportunity for challenge. The Court held that the length of time that
permits remained in force without an actual expropriation upset the fair balance. In a
key passage, it stated that Sweden could have maintained fairness by compensating for
the delays in the process.55 This opened the door to a more general compensation
requirement. Soon after, in James and Lithgow, the Court conﬁrmed the importance of
the fair balance, and applied it to deprivations of property under the second sentence of
P1-1. Following Sporrong, it stated that ‘compensation terms are material to the
50 Handyside v United Kingdom (App No 5493/72) (1976) Series A No 24.
51 ibid [62].
52 In addition, that the conﬁscation was not discriminatory; the applicant maintained that art
14 discrimination was involved, on the basis of his political views [65]–[66].
53 Sporrong (n 2) [69].
54 Arguably, Marckx v Belgium (App No 6833/74) (1977) Series A No 31 [63] foreshadowed
Sporrong, as the Court declared that the ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions’ did not apply solely
to the enjoyment of possessions, but it expressed a general right of property, and therefore pro-
tected all rights associated with property. Hence, ‘the right to dispose of one’s property constitutes
a traditional and fundamental aspect of the right of property’. In doing so, it applied the classic
liberal conception of ownership as full dominion over the object of property.
55 ibid [73].
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assessment whether a fair balance has been struck between the various interests at stake
and, notably, whether or not a disproportionate burden has been imposed on the person
who has been deprived of his possessions.’56 Accordingly, the ‘taking of property
without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would normally consti-
tute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered justiﬁable’.57
Before considering the subsequent development of principles of compensation, it is
worth reﬂecting on the impact of Sporrong. Plainly, it re-aligned the liberal-social
democrat balance of P1-1. The adoption of the fair balance test favoured the liberal
model of the right to property, not only because it enhanced the protection of property,
but because the image of the balance treats State action as a threat to the individual.
Indirectly, the Court’s judgment also places full weight on the market as the measure
of individual entitlement. As the Commission noted, the expropriation permits were
issued at the inception of the development, and, in some cases, before the decisions on
the use of speciﬁc property or the character of the development, for a speciﬁc reason: to
freeze the amount of compensation that would be paid on expropriation.58 This would
ensure that, as development proceeded, those who were expropriated toward the
end of the project could not claim compensation for the enhancement of value to
their property arising from the development. The scheme therefore reﬂected a central
element of the post-War social democrat views on the sharing of the beneﬁts of re-
development: the increase in the value of land that was attributable to public invest-
ment should accrue to the public, rather than individual property owners. Indeed, the
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 pursued the same purpose, but by basing com-
pensation on the existing use value.59 This fundamental aspect of the legislative and
practical context was not even mentioned by Court. The judgment therefore casts doubt
on the social democrat views of property and value in the regulatory State.
But why did the Court in Sporrong make this shift?60 In its judgment, it said only
that the principle of the fair balance ‘is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is
also reﬂected in the structure of article 1 (P1-1)’.61 In an earlier passage, it put forward
the now-familiar statement on the three rules of P1-1:
The ﬁrst rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of
property; it is set out in the ﬁrst sentence of the ﬁrst paragraph. The second rule covers
deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second
sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are entitled,
amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest,
by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the
second paragraph.62
56 James (n 1) [54]; Lithgow (n 1) [120].
57 James ibid; Lithgow ibid [121].
58 Sporrong and Lo¨nnroth v Sweden (App No 7151/75; 7152/75) (1980) [123] (EComHR).
59 See also the recommendations of the Irish Committee on the Price of Building Land,
discussed above, text accompanying (n 36).
60 In Sporrong (n 2) [69], after stating the fair balance principle, the Court stated that the
‘Agent of the Government recognised the need for such a balance.’ However, the Court went on to
say that ‘At the hearing on the morning of 23 February 1982, he pointed out that, under the
Expropriation Act, an expropriation permit must not be issued if the public purpose in question
can be achieved in a different way; when this is being assessed, full weight must be given both
to the interests of the individual and to the public interest.’ This falls far short of a general
concession that the fair balance must apply in every case, especially in respect of substantive
elements. 61 ibid [69]. 62 ibid [61].
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The Commission had treated the case as a control on the use of property, under the
third ‘rule’ of P1-1. In Handyside, the Court also classiﬁed the conﬁscation of the
property as a control on use. However, in Sporrong, the Court treated the permits
and the restrictions as separate matters. The odd aspect of this approach is that the
permits did not have any direct effect on property rights. They simply made the
property less marketable and less valuable as security. But, since they had no direct
impact, the Court held that were not ‘controls on the use of property’, and the third
sentence did not apply. Hence, the Court was able to avoid dealing with the Handyside
judgment.
The Court also decided that the permits did not amount to a deprivation of property,
under the second sentence. It might then have been thought that the permits did not
amount to an interference with property at all, as they did not restrict any of the rights
of property: the owners could still occupy, rent, sell or otherwise dispose of the prop-
erty. However, the Court treated the permits as interfering with the enjoyment of
possessions. In effect, it extended P1-1 to protect property from both direct and indirect
interference with rights of property. In any case, the Handyside principle would seem
applicable: if States were the sole judge of the necessity of laws that had a direct impact
on the use of property, surely they were also the sole judges of the necessity of laws
that had an indirect impact on the use of property. However, the Court did not even
mention Handyside in its judgment.63 Instead, the Court introduced the fair balance
principle to P1-1.
The reasoning therefore does not get us any closer to the Court’s reasons for moving
to the liberal model of P1-1. The majority in Sporrong certainly did not claim that its
judgment was an example of evolutive or dynamic interpretation. Indeed, it would
have been a difﬁcult case to make: there was no emerging consensus that social
democracy no longer represented legitimate political views on property and regulation.
Instead, the Court refers only to the text of P1-1 and the Convention as a whole.
In other words, the Court reads P1-1 as though it had always been intended to incor-
porate the fair balance test. Similar thinking is evident in James and Lithgow, where, as
explained above, the Court stated that the right to property in P1-1 would be ‘largely
illusory and ineffective in the absence of a principle requiring compensation in all
but exceptional circumstances.64 Whether protection would be illusory or ineffective
depends, of course, on the purpose of the right to property. If one assumes that P1-1 is
a liberal right, then plainly some form of compensation guarantee based on market
values would be needed; if it reﬂects social democrat values, it does not.
In fairness, however, it must be noted that James and Lithgow may be read as an
effort to limit the reach of Sporrong. To begin with, the Court did not ﬁnd that the fair
balance was upset in either case. In both James and Lithgow, the Court made it clear
that States have a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether a deprivation of
possessions is in the public interest and, equally important, in determining the method
of valuing property.65 This afﬁrms the social democrat emphasis on ensuring that
legislatures have the power to pursue ambitious social and economic programmes.
Moreover, in both cases it stated that ‘Legitimate objectives of “public interest”, such
as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater
63 There were references toMarckx, but only in connection with the meaning of ‘possessions’
(ibid [57]) and actual loss (ibid [73]).
64 James (n 1) [54]; Lithgow (n 1) [120]. 65 James, ibid; Lithgow, ibid [122].
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social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.’66 This
gives some scope for the social democrat principle that the State must have some
room to consider social obligations associated with ownership in determining an
appropriate compensation level. Indeed, the Court may have taken some inspiration
from the Italian and German constitutional jurisprudence. As explained above, both
provide a limited substantive guarantee: some compensation may be required for ex-
propriation, but in neither jurisdiction does the constitution guarantee full compen-
sation. This may have suggested to the Court that it would be possible to construct a
limited compensation guarantee without compromising the social democrat element of
P1-1.67
IV. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND DEPARTURES FROM MARKET VALUE COMPENSATION
The next question is, of course: what circumstances justify a departure? And, in par-
ticular, how far does the Court’s jurisprudence acknowledge the social democrat aspect
of P1-1? ‘Economic restructuring’ and ‘social justice’ are the two examples given in
Lithgow and James, but how would they apply?
A. Economic Restructuring
Economic restructuring could include several possibilities. The ﬁrst relates to the cost
of a project. Can the State justify a departure from the usual standard because the
project is important and yet it would be unaffordable at full compensation? This is,
plainly, a difﬁcult argument to make in any speciﬁc circumstances, as the State could
increase taxes to produce the funds to compensate. Indeed, as Justice Scalia argued in
Pennell v San Jose, full compensation would improve democratic governance by
forcing legislators to present taxpayers with the full cost of projected programmes.68
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the State would claim that raising taxes
would have harmful economic consequences that would outweigh the cost of aban-
doning the project. However, it is clear from Scordino v Italy69 that the Court is very
reluctant to entertain such an argument, at least where it is based on general ﬁnancial
conditions. In this case, the relevant law authorized expropriation with compensation at
about half of the market value. There was nothing particularly compelling about the
speciﬁc use of the property: the law applied to expropriations over a speciﬁed period
for a number of different purposes. The Italian government argued that the compen-
sation provisions of the law had been an urgent and temporary measure to aid in the
stabilization of public ﬁnances during a period of considerable uncertainty.70 It also
claimed that the law ‘reﬂected a “community spirit” and the “current political desire”
to establish a system going beyond traditional nineteenth-century liberalism’, and
66 James, ibid; Lithgow, ibid [121].
67 James, ibid; Lithgow, ibid [120]: ‘the Court observes that under the legal systems of the
Contracting States, the taking of property in the public interest without payment of compensation
is treated as justiﬁable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes.’ The
Court does not explain why this is relevant, or even explain whether it is referring to a general
practice or a justiciable constitutional principle: see generally Allen (n 8) 301–302.
68 Pennell (n 11) and accompanying text.
69 Scordino v Italy (App No 36813/97) ECHR 2006-V. 70 ibid [60].
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referred to the case law discussed above on compensation as ‘serious relief ’.71 The
Italian law certainly did go beyond liberalism, but the Court of Human Rights held that
compensation should have been at the market value.72 More generally, the Court of
Human Rights made it clear that departures from market value can only be justiﬁed by
reference to the purpose of the speciﬁc scheme or circumstances of the property
owner.73 In other words, general ﬁnancial conditions do not provide sufﬁcient justiﬁ-
cation to depart from market value compensation.
This casts some doubt on the scope of the Lithgow exception. In Scordino, the
Italian government did not suggest that the purpose of the expropriation had anything
to do with economic restructuring, but only with a short term crisis in public ﬁnances.
Even in Lithgow, it is not clear that the exception applied to the facts. In Lithgow,
which concerned the nationalization of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, the
shareholders claimed that, although the legislation promised full value for their shares,
the means of valuing their shares produced far less than full value. The Court denied
their claims, citing both the breadth of the margin of appreciation and the exception for
economic restructuring.74 Arguably, the Court might have relied only on the margin of
appreciation: the United Kingdom was required to pay full compensation, and had a
very wide discretion to determine how to value the property.75
The recent litigation involving the Northern Rock bank provides another prominent
example of this approach.76 The United Kingdom nationalized the Northern Rock
when it became unable to meet its obligations and could not ﬁnd a suitable private
sector buyer, and a complete collapse would have caused severe damage to the econ-
omy. The statutory order authorizing the nationalization stated that compensation
payable to a shareholder would be ‘an amount equal to the value immediately before
the transfer time’ of the shares.77 However, the legislation and order instructed the
valuer to assume that, immediately before the transfer, (i) the Northern Rock would
not receive exceptional support from the Bank of England or the Treasury, (ii) it was
not a going concern and (iii), it was in administration and would be wound up. Not
surprisingly, the valuer eventually concluded that the bank had no value before the
nationalization.
A group of shareholders challenged the valuation assumptions before the Court of
Appeal. In broad terms, their argument was similar to that of the shareholders in
Lithgow: legislation promised the value of the shares, but the valuation assumptions
effectively denied any real prospect of full value (or, in the Northern Rock case, any
value at all).
71 ibid [90]; see text accompanying (n 33) and (n 34). 72 ibid [257].
73 ibid [102], [132].
74 M Mendelson ‘The United Kingdom Nationalization Cases and the European Convention
on Human Rights’ (1986) 57 BYIL 33.
75 Compare the French Conseil d’E´tat’s decisions regarding similar issues over the valuation
of shares in nationalised industries in the early 1980s, as discussed in MH Mendelson
‘International Law and the Valuation of Nationalised Shares: Two French Decisions’ (1985) 34
ICLQ 284.
76 R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Treasury Commissioner [2009]
EWCA Civ 788; NJ Calamita, ‘The British Bank Nationalizations: An International Law
Perspective’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 119.
77 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, s 5(4); Northern Rock plc Compensation Scheme
Order 2008, para 3(2) and 6.
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The Court of Appeal dismissed the claim. As in Lithgow, the nationalization could
have been treated as an example of economic restructuring, which could justify below-
market compensation. However, the Court of Appeal decided that the assumptions fell
within the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation. Given the breadth of the margin,
it could not be said that the shareholders did not receive an amount ‘reasonably related’
to the value of their shares. Ultimately, the Lithgow exception for economic
restructuring has not been closely tested, even in Lithgow itself.
B. Social Justice
The exception for social justice has attracted more attention. The issue arose in James,
because it concerned below-market expropriation of the freeholds of property. Under
the Leasehold Reform Act 1967,78 tenants under long term residential leases were
given the right to buy the freehold, at a price that could exclude the value of the
buildings. The United Kingdom argued that the tenants should not be required to pay
for the building, because the typical long lease required the tenant to maintain the
property. Over the period of a long lease, the cost of maintenance would equal or
exceed the cost of constructing from new. Hence, the government claimed that the
typical tenant would have already paid for the building, and the owner had no moral
claim to be compensated for something it had not paid for.79 In that sense, the legis-
lation reﬂected the idea of social obligation that was part of the Italian and
German constitutional systems, which incorporate the idea that ownership includes
social obligations that may, in some situations, warrant something less than market
value compensation. The Court accepted the United Kingdom’s argument, which
suggests that P1-1 was broad enough to accommodate the social democrat view
of property and social obligation. Accordingly, it stated that the needs of social
justice would allow departures from full market compensation in exceptional circum-
stances.80
The issue has been raised in a number of cases on transitional justice. In some
States, post-communist reform involved the expropriation of land for something less
than full compensation. The justiﬁcation lies in the manner of acquisition during the
pre-transition era, especially where there is a feeling that the acquisition of title was
tainted by some form of participation or complicity with the former regime. In such
cases, the State may argue that there is a public interest in ensuring that morally
questionable titles should not be entitled to full compensation, or possibly to any
compensation.81 As such, these cases are more about transitional justice than social
justice. In other words, the focus is on the correction of past wrongs rather than the
present or future distribution of the basic goods needed for a meaningful life. Hence,
these cases do not necessarily raise the differences in the liberal and social democrat
78 As amended by the Housing Act 1969, the Housing Act 1974, the Leasehold Reform Act
1979, the Housing Act 1980 and the Housing and Building Control Act 1984.
79 James (n 1) [57].
80 Lithgow (n 1) [121]; cf Broniowski v Poland (App No 31443/96) ECHR 2004-V 1 (GC),
about the unconstitutional cancellation of claims to be given property. The scale of the problem
justiﬁed cancellation at less than the face value of the claims.
81 See T Allen, ‘Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights’
(2006/7) 13 Columbia JEL 1, 29–44.
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views of property and human rights. Nevertheless, cases are often framed in terms of
social justice, probably because of the open acknowledgement of the importance of
social justice in James, and because the distinctions between transitional and social
justice are not clear-cut. It may be the case, for example, that a communist adminis-
tration produced a distribution of property and resources that the present government
regards as socially unjust. The effect is that some of the transitional justice cases have
had an important impact on the place of social democracy within P1-1.
These issues were comprehensively reviewed by the Grand Chamber in the seminal
case Jahn v Germany,82 with an equivocal outcome. The applicants had held land in
the former German Democratic Republic, but under the laws in force at the time, they
should have restored that land to a pool of State-owned land as they did not occupy it
for their own use. They did not do so and, due to administrative lapses, they were not
required to do so; however, many others in the same situation did restore the land.
During the late stages of the regime, legislation was enacted that had the unintended
effect of recognizing those who had not obeyed the law as the titled owners of the
land. This produced an awkward result: those who had obeyed the law were left with
nothing, whereas those who had evaded the law were now fully entitled to the land.
After re-uniﬁcation, Germany sought to reverse the legislation, on the basis that it
would be inequitable to those who had obeyed the law. Hence, the applicants, and
those in a similar position, would be expropriated without compensation.
The Constitutional Court noted that its case law distinguishes between an expro-
priation under article 14(3) and a delineation of the scope of property under article
14(1). This was not an expropriation, but the acquisition was not for a public good, in
the sense that the land was not acquired for use in a State-sponsored project. Instead,
the law was intended to secure justice across a distinct class. Hence, there was no
constitutional guarantee of compensation. Nevertheless, under article 14(1), it is still
necessary to ‘strike a fair balance and proportionate relationship between the legitimate
interests of the persons concerned.’83 This should take into account ‘both the legal
position of the owner and the requirements of the system of socially fair ownership
under article 14 · 2 of the Basic Law.’ The requirement for socially fair ownership
meant that it was legitimate to enact legislation to plug the ‘hidden loophole’ in the law
that had enabled the applicants to acquire title. Moreover, the impact on the applicants
was not disproportionate: given the circumstances, and in particular the disparity in
treatment with those who had obeyed the law under the GDR, they could not have
expected the legislature to leave their titles untouched.
The Court of Human Rights initially took a very different view of the case. The case
was ﬁrst heard by the Third Section of the Court, which held that compensation could
not be denied on the basis of the manner in which they had acquired the property:
The Court cannot . . . agree with the Government’s reasoning in the instant case
regarding the concept of ‘illegitimate’ ownership, which is an eminently political
concept . . . [R]egardless of the applicants’ situation before the entry into force of the
82 Jahn v Germany (App No 46720/99; 72203/01; 72552/01) ECHR 2005-VI (GC); U
Deutsch, ‘Expropriation without Compensation—The European Court of Human Rights
Sanctions German Legislation Expropriating the Heirs of ‘New Farmers’’ (2005) 6 German LJ
1367.
83 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 6 October 2000, 1 BvR 1637/99; passages in the
text are from the ECHR translation, ibid [42].
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Modrow Law, there is no doubt that they legally acquired full ownership of their land when
that Law came into force.84
The Third Section did not explain what it meant by an ‘eminently political concept’ of
title. The judgment does refer to the principle that departures from full market com-
pensation may be permitted and, ‘in exceptional circumstances’, the State need not
provide any compensation.85 However, the passage quoted above seems to undermine
that principle. At the very least, it undermines the Basic Law’s position that a system of
‘socially fair ownership’ may have required the adjustment of titles, as well as the
James principle that the pursuit of social justice may take into account the moral
entitlement of the owner to compensation.86
Germany appealed to the Grand Chamber, which held that there was no violation.
The Grand Chamber’s reasoning was very similar to that of the Constitutional Court.
The applicants had no moral expectation of compensation, as they had beneﬁted from a
windfall as a result of the administrative and legislative failings of the former GDR.
The purpose of ensuring equitable treatment amongst all similarly placed individuals
was a legitimate purpose,87 and in any case, the applicants had no settled expectation
that their titles would not be removed, as the re-uniﬁcation of Germany was ‘inevitably
marked by upheavals and uncertainties’ and the speciﬁc issues concerning their claims
were well-known. The Grand Chamber speciﬁcally referred to the James principle, and
described this case as one where the pursuit of social justice justiﬁes a departure from
full compensation. Hence, although the case was not truly about social democrat
policies, it appears to afﬁrm that P1-1 accommodates a social democrat outlook on
property.
It must be noted, however, that the judgment is not unanimous, and other tran-
sitional justice cases suggest that the Court’s views on social justice are narrowing.88
This is clearly evident in Urba´rska v Slovakia.89 Under the communist regime, the
owners of agricultural land were required to put it at the disposal of State-owned or co-
operative farms. Some of this land was later made freely available to groups of allot-
ment gardeners. In many cases, the owners retained title, although clearly their titles
had very little actual value without access or use of the land. Post-communist legis-
lation restored some rights to owners, but subject to restrictions on their power to evict
tenants and very tight controls on rent. The owners were also required to transfer title to
the tenants on request. The State would provide compensation, in the form of substitute
land or money. The applicants claimed that the compensation should be based on
present market values, including the current development potential of the land.90
However, the government felt that this would confer an unearned beneﬁt on the own-
ers, as the current value was largely down to the improvements made by the gardeners
and public investment in the surrounding areas. Accordingly, replacement land would
84 Jahn v Germany (App No 46720/99; 72203/01; 72552/01) (2004) (Third Section) [90].
85 ibid [82].
86 In fairness, however, the Court did not say that the fair balance required full compensation
on these facts, but only that the applicants should have been ‘adequately compensated.’ ibid [91]
(emphasis added). 87 Jahn (n 82) (GC) [116].
88 There was a signiﬁcant dissenting group in the Grand Chamber, and the Third Section
judges were 7–0 in favour of the applicants. As the Grand Chamber went 11–6 against the
applicants, and two of the judges sat on both judgments, the split was 11–11.
89 Urba´rska Obec Trencˇianske Biskupice v Slovakia (App No 74258/01) (2007).
90 ibid [52] and [102].
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be comparable in quality to the land as it stood before the owners had put it at the
disposal of the State or cooperative farms. Monetary compensation was also based on
the value at that time.
The issues were therefore very similar to those of James: do property owners have
a human right to compensation for elements of the property’s value that are not
attributable to them? The Slovakian Constitutional Court answered in the negative and
upheld the legislation. However, the Court of Human Rights decided that there was a
violation of P1-1. It said that there should be a ‘direct link’ between the public interest
supporting departure and the level of compensation: ‘A sliding scale should be applied
in this respect, balancing the scope and degree of importance of the public interest
against the nature and amount of compensation provided to the persons concerned.’91
This does not add anything to the James principles, as it is implicit in the idea of
balancing. However, the Court later stated that ‘There is no indication that, in general,
persons using land in allotment gardens belong to a socially weak or particularly
vulnerable part of the population.’92 This was not alleged by the Slovak government.
Indeed, it was not part of the United Kingdom’s case in James, or even in Jahn v
Germany. Instead, the argument concentrated on the moral expectations of the owners:
they had not created the value for which they sought compensation, and that should be
enough to deny that they had a human right to that compensation. Plainly, protection of
the socially weak and vulnerable is part of a social democrat agenda, but it does not
represent its full extent.
Like Jahn, Urba´rska is factually as much about transitional justice as social justice
or social democracy. However, a key assumption is evident in both cases—especially
Urba´rska—that undermines social democracy. That is, the Court assumes that tran-
sitional justice is itself transitional: in other words, States are allowed some margin to
adjust entitlements in a transitional period, but the transition ends at some point.93 The
crucial point is that transition must culminate with a free and unregulated market
economy.
The movement away from social democracy is also evident in recent cases on
rent controls. Housing, tenancy rights and controls over rent and security of tenure
were important elements of post-War social policy in many European States. As
written, P1-1 appears to give States a wide discretion in the area, as the third sentence
preserves the ‘the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest’. As explained above, in
Handyside, the Court was clear that States were the sole judges of the necessity of
controls on the use of property, and the Court’s role was limited to supervision of the
lawfulness and the purpose of the restriction in question.94
The Sporrong judgment therefore subjected regulatory policies to closer human
rights scrutiny, especially as it shifted P1-1 to the liberal view that an unregulated
market is the normal state of affairs, from which all departures require justiﬁcation.
Nevertheless, in the leading early case of Mellacher v Austria,95 the Court indicated
that rent controls would only violate P1-1 in very exceptional circumstances. In this
case, the tenancy laws and rent controls severely restricted the capacity of the applicant
91 ibid [126]. 92 ibid [131].
93 See also M Vartu, ‘Transition as a Concept of European Human Rights Law’ (2009) 2
EHRLR 2009. 94 Handyside (n 50) [62].
95 Mellacher v Austria (App No 10522/83; 11011/84; 11070/84) (1989) Series A No 169.
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landlords to earn a proﬁt. Indeed, they claimed that the rents they were permitted to
charge were not even sufﬁcient to cover the costs of maintaining their properties.96
As the dissenting judges put it, ‘The applicants do not seem to be far wrong when they
say that the reduced [monthly] rent now corresponds to the price of a simple meal for
two persons in a cheap restaurant.’97 However, the majority held that the impact did
not upset the fair balance, especially as the controls were intended to further social
justice.98
A series of cases followingMellacher conﬁrmed that regulations may have a severe
impact on the value and proﬁtability of property, without violating P1-1.99 However, in
recent years, the Court has become less willing to allow regulation to stand in cases
involving social justice. Initially, these cases arose in countries in transition from
communism. They are similar to Urba´rska, as they involve the restoration of a degree
of control to owners who were effectively dispossessed during the communist
era. Unlike Urba´rska, the primary focus fell on the severity of the controls on rent,
maintenance and eviction.
The leading case is Hutten-Czapska v Poland,100 in which the Court considered
Polish laws that had the effect of keeping rents well below the costs of maintenance.
On its face, the situation resembled that in Mellacher, although the complexity of the
schemes in each case makes direct comparison difﬁcult. In Hutten-Czapska, the Court
found that P1-1 had been violated. On one reading, the Court challenged the social
democrat philosophy of property and social obligations, as it stated that P1-1 provides
landlords with an ‘entitlement to derive proﬁt from their property’. Not only is there an
implied right to compensation, but now it seems that there is an implied right to earn a
proﬁt.101 However, it should be noted that the Court did not explain what it meant by
‘proﬁt’. Is it the potential for earning revenue? Or for earning revenue in excess of
ongoing costs? Or for earning a rate of return on investment comparable to other
investments? Or does some other standard apply?
It could be argued that Hutten-Czapska is not primarily about substantive fairness,
but about the separation of powers and the administration of justice. Beginning in
2000, the Polish Constitutional Court was locked in a battle with the legislature over
the constitutionality of rent and tenancy laws. The Court would declare legislation
unconstitutional, only for the legislature to make minor amendments that would come
back before the Court, which would then declare that the amended legislation was still
unconstitutional. Arguably, the Grand Chamber was more concerned with the re-
lationship between the Polish court and the legislature than it was with the detail of the
rent control laws. The Court has dealt with many cases where administrative failings
are a basis for ﬁnding a violation of P1-1; in such cases, it is not the substantive basis of
96 It is not entirely clear whether the Court accepted this description: ibid [55]–[56].
97 ibid (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Cremona, Bindschedler-Robert, Go¨lcu¨klu¨,
Bernhardt and Spielmann).
98 This even applied in cases where tenants were entitled to a judicial modiﬁcation of a
contract that they had apparently entered into without reservation: ibid [56].
99 T Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart, Oxford, 2005) 152–153.
100 Hutten-Czapska v Poland (App No 35014/97) ECHR 2006-VIII.
101 The judgment does not indicate whether the property was without value, or even without
considerable value. Plainly, it would have been worth more without the rent controls, but in
countries that regulate land use (ie virtually all European states), land is worth more in the absence
of regulation.
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the law that is important, but the failure to apply the law in any effective manner.102
Indeed, most of Grand Chamber’s judgment in Hutten-Czapska simply echoes
the reasoning and conclusions of the most recent judgment of the Constitutional Court.
As such, the Grand Chamber gave a clear message to the Polish legislature and
government that they could not ignore or avoid the judgments of the Constitutional
Court.
If the Grand Chamber’s real concern was with the separation of powers and the
administration of justice, the judgment would have been consistent with both liberal
and social democrat ideals.103 However, it was the scrutiny of social justice legislation
that has been picked up in subsequent judgments. In Radovici and Sta˘nescu v
Romania,104 shortcomings in legislative drafting and the administration of the law left
some landlords unable to evict tenants or even to charge rent for a number of years.
Factually, the case falls into the category of cases primarily concerned with the ad-
ministration of law rather than its substance, and could have been decided on that basis.
However, the Court framed its reasoning in terms of the limits of social justice:
The Court accepts that the Romanian State inherited from the communist regime an acute
shortage of housing available for rent at an affordable level and, as a result, had to balance
the exceptionally difﬁcult and socially sensitive issues involved in reconciling the con-
ﬂicting interests of landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure the protection
of the property rights of the former and, on the other, to respect the social rights of the
latter. Nevertheless, the legitimate interests of the community in such situations call for a
fair distribution of the social and ﬁnancial burden involved in the transformation and
reform of the country’s housing supply. This burden cannot, as in the present cases, be
placed on one particular social group, however important the interests of the other group
or the community as a whole. . ..105
The ﬁnal sentence suggests that the Court was not primarily concerned with the rule of
law or administration of justice, but about regulation and distributive justice. Indeed,
the suggestion that distributive justice cannot be accomplished through regulation
reﬂects the liberal mistrust of social planning and redistribution by legislation. The
logic of Urba´rska and Radovici would defeat redistribution: Urba´rska suggests the
only form of social justice is that which seeks to protect the weak, and Radovici that
the protection of the weak cannot be furthered by the modiﬁcation of property rights of
owners.
It is especially signiﬁcant that the reasoning of Hutten-Czapska and Radovici has
also crept into cases that do not deal with transitional justice or administrative failings.
In a series of cases from Malta, the Court has declared that legislation that kept rents
102 T Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart, Oxford, 2005) 159–161.
103 However, if that was its primary objective, the effect on the jurisprudence of P1-1 is
unfortunate, because it ignores the context of Polish constitutional law. That is, the Polish
Constitution guarantees housing and tenancy rights; as it also guarantees property, these rights
must be balanced against each other. Under the Convention, art 8 provides a right to respect for
the home, and hence it is applicable to evictions; however, it does not provide a positive claim
against the State to be provided with a home. The Constitutional Court’s judgment raises the
importance of the constitutional rights of tenants; by contrast, the Grand Chamber’s judgment
does not mention art 8. It acknowledges that there is a community interest in protecting tenants,
but that puts tenants in a weaker position than they would be under the Polish Constitution.
104 Radovici and Sta˘nescu v Romania (App No 68479/01, 71351/01 and 71352/01) (2006).
105 ibid [88] (emphasis added).
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well below the market rate violated P1-1.106 Unlike Hutten-Czapska and Radovici, it
appeared that gross rental income did exceed the running costs in these cases.
Moreover, unlike Hutten-Czapska, the legislation was enacted as a long term structural
policy, sustained by different governments over a lengthy period. In some respects, its
effects were similar to those of planning laws. In the United Kingdom, for example,
agricultural land is worth far less than residential land, and yet there is no suggestion
that a refusal of a request for a change of use would breach P1-1 simply because
it denies more proﬁtable uses to the property owner. Nevertheless, in the Maltese
cases, the Court picked up the language from the transitional cases, as it referred to an
owner’s ‘entitlement to derive proﬁts’ from their property, and even a ‘right to receive
a market rent’.107 The Court also queried the use of regulation as a form of distributive
justice and, in particular, the human rights implications of imposing an obligation
on a property owner to provide accommodation at something less than a full market
rate.
C. Value and Social Obligation
There is a further element of the social democrat view of the value and compensation
that deserves examination. It is the idea that the value of property is at least partly
produced by social or community action. This may be directly related to the speciﬁc
asset: for example, public investment in infrastructure may raise the value of a speciﬁc
plot of land. If so, the social democrat may argue that the owner has no human right to
compensation for value created by that investment. Indeed, this was one of the reasons
given by Slovakia for denying full compensation in Urba´rska. Or, there may be other
values associated with the property that may be regarded as public rather than private,
even though title is held privately. For example, land may have special meaning to the
community as a site of religious, scientiﬁc, environmental or historic interest. It may be
the case that the very aspect of community interest also increases the market value of
the land. The issue is whether compensation must be paid for the market value, or
whether the value associated with these speciﬁc attributes may be excluded.
A social democrat construction of P1-1 would regard these values as socially con-
stituted, and hence there would be no human right to expect compensation for ‘public’
values. In other words, the community, acting through the legislature, could legiti-
mately take the view that certain attributes of speciﬁc types of property should not be
valued for compensation. In some cases, this is uncontroversial for both liberals and
social democrats. For example, the valuation of property would normally exclude its
value in an illegal use, because an ownership interest does not include a right to use the
property illegally. Social democrats go further, as they maintain that property is subject
to social obligations that go beyond illegality, and these obligations may reduce the
value of property that is recognized on expropriation. It allows the State some leeway
to deﬁne those values, and hence to pay something less than full compensation on
expropriation. It seems, however, that the Court is very reluctant to allow this in
106 Ghigo v Malta (App No 31122/05) (2006); Fleri Soler and Camilleri v Malta (App No
35349/05) (2006); Edwards v Malta (App No 17647/04) (2006); Amato Gauci v Malta (App No
47045/06) (2009); cf Zammit and Others v Malta (App No 16756/90) (1989) 68 DR 312.
107 Ghigo ibid [49], [66]; Fleri Soler ibid [74], [78]; Edwards ibid [75], [78] Amato Gauci
ibid [63].
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practice, as shown by the Grand Chamber judgment in Kozaciog˘lu v Turkey.108
This case concerned the amount of compensation payable on the expropriation of
a building that had been designated as a ‘cultural asset’ under heritage legislation.
Under the relevant Turkish law, compensation was based on the market value of
the land and the cost of constructing a replacement building of similar design and size.
On its face, the Turkish principles should leave the owner no worse off. However,
in the case of designated buildings, there were two further points that complicated
matters.
The ﬁrst was depreciation. New buildings would be worth more than older (desig-
nated) buildings, because maintenance would be cheaper. Accordingly, depreciation
applied to valuation. In this case, it was 50 per cent of the cost of reconstruction.109 The
second concerned the building’s architectural and historical features, as Turkish law
speciﬁcally excluded these features from the valuation.110 Heritage belonged to the
nation, and hence the nation was not required to compensate for it on expropriation.
The market price might well reﬂect the desirability of a heritage building, but that
would not be available on expropriation.
The case therefore neatly raises the tension between the liberal and social democrat
visions of the right to property. The liberal model would hold that the owner is entitled
to the price obtainable on the market. The State cannot declare that some feature of the
property ‘belongs’ to it. A social democrat would argue that the legislature has an
important role in determining the value of property, and that the legislature may decide
that the public interest demands that some values that are realisable in a private
transaction are not compensatable on expropriation. The Court appeared to accept this
argument, as it declared that the protection of historical and cultural heritage is a
legitimate objective of public interest that ‘may call for less than reimbursement of the
full market value’.111 However, it did so without explaining why the protection of
heritage would justify a departure from the ordinary rule, and it then ignored the
principle in the rest of the judgment. It found the compensation principles did not strike
a fair balance, on the basis that, if depreciation was taken into account, so should the
special features of the property that were associated with depreciation: ‘not only is
such a system likely to penalize those owners of listed buildings who assume burden-
some maintenance costs, it deprives them of any value that might arise from the spe-
ciﬁc features of their property.’112 Compensation should have, ‘to a reasonable
degree’, taken the property’s ‘speciﬁc features’ into account.
The difﬁculty with this reasoning is that it merely summarizes the effect of the
Turkish legislation, without offering any analysis. Indeed, it does not even recognize
the central issue, as the legislature deprived owners of the heritage value because it felt
108 Kozaciog˘lu v Turkey (App No 2334/03) (2009).
109 Taken alone, the depreciation rules might have been challenged: see Katikaridis v Greece
(App No 19385/92) ECHR 1996-V 1673; Tsomtsos and Others v Greece (App No 20680/92)
ECHR 1996-V 1699; Papachelas v Greece (App No 31423/96) ECHR 1999-II 1.
110 In this case, however, the owner managed to get the valuers to indicate the value of the
special features. It was not clear just how they managed to do so. Turkish law was very clear these
features were not relevant, and yet the Turkish valuation panel explicitly took them into account.
In any case, the Turkish Court of Cassation reviewed the case and refused to allow the
re-adjustment for historic value. The ﬁnal amount of compensation was the depreciated amount.
111 Kozaciog˘lu (n 108) [64]. 112 ibid [70].
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that the value belonged to the nation. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Maruste addresses
the point directly:
the applicant himself did not create the asset’s extra value—he simply took proper care of
it, as every responsible and good citizen would. Thus, the speciﬁc status of a cultural asset
was accorded to the property by the State in the general (and not commercial) interest.
This statement is entirely consistent with the social democrat view of property. If
heritage value is public, it is legitimate for a State to refuse to compensate for it, and
there would have been nothing intrinsically wrong with the system of valuation in
Kozaciog˘lu (subject to a possible challenge to the rigidity of the depreciation rules).
At a deeper level, the real issue is, once again, the relevance of the social democrat
model of the right to property. The judgment conﬁrms the Court’s faith in the market:
individuals acting through private economic processes, rather than public political
processes, exclusively determine the substantive content of human rights. Perhaps
there are sound reasons for this, but at no level does the Court seek to explain what
they are.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to property is one of the most frequently litigated Convention rights. The
volume of litigation is at least partly due to the adoption of the fair balance principle in
Sporrong, as afﬁrmed in a multitude of subsequent cases. Plainly, it is too late for the
Court to revisit Sporrong, and it has never indicated any interest in doing so. However,
the result is that P1-1 has been given shape in a way that was never intended. Of course,
the Court does not restrict itself to an originalist interpretation, and only rarely makes
reference to the travaux pre´paratoires. Nevertheless, we have never had a close
examination by the Court of the purpose and nature of P1-1, except for the hollow
assertions that a right to property would be ‘largely illusory and ineffective’ without a
compensation guarantee, or that property owners have ’ an ‘entitlement to derive proﬁt
from their property’, or that the market necessarily directs the content of human rights.
These statements represent profoundly important political choices, and yet the Court
has made these choices without any apparent recognition of their signiﬁcance. Even if
property is essential to individual dignity and autonomy in the same way as rights to
life, security of the person, freedom of expression, and therefore that it is equally
deserving of protection as other Convention rights, it also has characteristics of
the social and economic rights to the basic needs such as a decent housing, a safe
environment, reasonable health care and education. It is these characteristics that
are being ignored by the Court in its revival of a liberal theory of property.
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